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VILLAGE OF TANANA: ENHANCING
TRIBAL POWER BY AFFIRMING
CONCURRENT TRIBAL
JURISDICTION TO INITIATE ICWADEFINED CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS, BOTH INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE OF INDIAN COUNTRY
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ABSTRACT
This Article provides an overview of the significant cases that have defined
state-tribal relations in Alaska as related to Indian child proceedings and
further discusses various policies that have been implemented over time. After
outlining these cases and shifting policies, the Article examines the current
state of the law in Alaska with a focus on State v. Native Village of
Tanana, which clarified confusion regarding the inherent jurisdiction held by
federally recognized Alaska Native tribes to initiate the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA)-defined child custody proceedings. Finally, the Article discusses
those jurisdictional questions left unresolved by Tanana to be decided at a
later time under specific factual circumstances.

INTRODUCTION
There are 229 federally recognized Alaska Native tribes1 in Alaska,
including the Native Village of Tanana.2 Most of the lands in and
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around these villages were conveyed under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA).3 In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government,4 the United States Supreme Court held that such ANCSA
lands do not constitute “Indian country” within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 1151.5 As a result, most of the land held by Alaska Native tribes
is not within a “reservation” as that term is defined in ICWA.6 Such
tribes are, however, expressly included in ICWA’s definition of an
“Indian tribe,”7 and many operate their own tribal court systems, which
typically carry a heavy docket of child-welfare cases.8

1. “The term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band,
nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior
acknowledges to exist as an Indian Tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2) (2006).
2. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a-1(a), 479a(2) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to publish a list of recognized tribes, including “Alaska Native tribe[s]”);
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218, 40,219, 40,222 (Aug. 11,
2009) (listing the Native Village of Tanana as a federally recognized tribe that
has “the immunities and privileges available to other federally acknowledged
Indian tribes . . . as well as the responsibilities, powers, limitations and
obligations of such tribes”); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364,
54,366 (Oct. 21, 1993) (noting that Alaska Native tribes have the “right, subject to
general principles of Federal Indian law, to exercise the same inherent and
delegated authorities available to other tribes”).
3. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1613 (2006); see also Alaska Native Claim Settlement
Act (ANCSA) Land Conveyances, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME,
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=habitatoversight.ancsa
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2011).
4. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
5. Id. at 532–34; see also DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES
AND AMERICAN LAWS 1−33 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the history and background
of the federal government’s relationship to Alaska Natives).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(10) (2006); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit at 4, Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010)
(No. 09-960).
7. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2006).
8. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A DIRECTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
ALASKA OUTSIDE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 47 n.84 (1999). Tanana Chiefs
provided the following statistics, which compare annual children’s cases
handled by the region’s twenty-seven tribal courts and councils with state court
cases from the same village during the period July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998:
State
Tribal
Children in custody
135
147
Adoptions finalized
4
9
Guardianships granted
2
4
Children returned home
25
86
Children in foster care to age
4
2
Average length of foster care
13 months
9 months
Id.
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For many years the State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribes sought
to work cooperatively in recognition of their shared jurisdiction over
proceedings involving tribal children.9 This cooperative effort was
encouraged by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in John v. Baker,10
which held that Alaska tribes, by virtue of their inherent powers as
sovereign nations, do possess non-territorial authority to resolve
domestic disputes, and nothing in the ICWA or Public Law 28011 (P.L.
280) diminishes this inherent authority.12 Then, in 2004, out of the blue, a
new Attorney General abruptly reversed course and declared that no
Alaska tribes possess any original jurisdiction over any children’s
proceedings absent affirmative reassumption of that jurisdiction
pursuant to the petitioning process set forth in ICWA § 1918.13 The
Attorney General buttressed this position by relying on a previous
ruling, Native Village of Nenana v. State, Department of Health & Social
Services,14 which held that an ICWA proceeding could not be transferred
from a state court to a tribal court under ICWA § 1911(b) without the
tribe first processing a § 1918 petition.15 The court in Nenana further
observed that a state’s jurisdiction under P.L. 280 is “exclusive” over
matters involving the custody of Indian children.16

9. See LISA JAEGER, TRIBAL COURT DEVELOPMENT: ALASKA TRIBES (3d ed.
2002), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/AKtribalct/index.html.
10. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
11. Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in part as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (2006)). The text of P.L. 280 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each of the [P.L. 280 States] shall have jurisdiction over civil causes
of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in
the areas of Indian country [within the State] . . . to the same extent that
such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State[.]
...
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by
an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority
which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil
law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of
civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (emphasis added).
12. John, 982 P.2d at 747–48.
13. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, A.G. FILE NO. 661-04-0467,
JURISDICTION OF STATE AND TRIBAL COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION MATTERS (2004)
[hereinafter RENKES OPINION].
14. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska
2001).
15. Id. at 221−22; RENKES OPINION, supra note 13.
16. 722 P.2d at 221.
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In the wake of the new Attorney General Opinion, the Office of
Children’s Services (OCS) and Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) ceased
their cooperative practices and adopted new policies to implement the
turnabout 2004 opinion.17 Because the State’s actions directly
jeopardized the integrity of virtually all tribal court proceedings in
Alaska involving tribal children, along with tribal members and others
who depend upon those proceedings, a lawsuit was brought to confirm
that Alaska tribes possess inherent original jurisdiction to initiate child
protection and adoption proceedings in their own tribal courts. In State
v. Native Village of Tanana,18 the Alaska Supreme Court held that Alaska
tribes possess inherent sovereign authority to initiate proceedings in
their tribal courts to protect their tribal children, including adoption and
child-in-need-of-aid (CINA) type proceedings, and they may exercise
that inherent authority without first petitioning the Secretary of the
Interior under § 1918 of ICWA.19 In so ruling, the court expressly
overruled Nenana and acknowledged:
[I]n the nearly 25 years since our Nenana decision, our view of
P.L. 280’s impact on tribal jurisdiction has become the minority
view—other courts and commentators have instead concluded
that P.L. 280 merely gives states concurrent jurisdiction with
tribes in Indian country. What remains of Nenana must now be
overruled. We adopt the view that P.L. 280 did not divest tribes
of all jurisdiction under § 1911(a), but rather created concurrent
jurisdiction with the State.20
With the express overruling of Nenana, the Tanana decision brings
state law into conformity with federal pronouncements and removes
any doubt that “Alaska Native tribes are entitled to all of the rights and
privileges of Indian tribes under ICWA, including procedural
safeguards imposed on states and § 1911(d) full faith and credit with
respect to ICWA-defined child custody orders to the same extent as
other states’ and foreign orders.”21
Between 2004 and the 2011 Tanana decision, the State of Alaska
disputed the existence of concurrent tribal jurisdiction over domestic
relations matters impacting the welfare of tribal children.22 The State’s
position relied upon unsettled state decisional law from the 1980s, even
though those decisions had been reconsidered in the years preceding the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746−48 (Alaska 2011).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 751−52.
See id. at 751.
Id.
See id. at 746−48.
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State’s change of position in 2004.23 This Article begins in Part I by
discussing the two federal statutes that are of greatest relevance to
Alaska’s Indian child welfare jurisprudence and to the decision in
Tanana. Then, in Parts II–IV the Article examines the history of confusion
in Alaska surrounding questions of tribal jurisdiction over child custody
matters. In Part V, the Article describes how Alaska’s Attorney General
changed its interpretation of the law and the effects of that change. With
the historical context in place, the Article then explains the recent Tanana
decision in Part VI and concludes by discussing remaining ambiguities
in the law in Part VII.

I. FEDERAL STATUTES
A.

The Indian Child Welfare Act

When Congress enacted ICWA in 1978, its goal was to establish
federal standards that protect the interest of Indian children and ensure
the stability and security of Indian tribes when Indian children are
removed from their families.24 It was Congress’ intent that ICWA’s
provisions should “reflect the unique values of Indian culture.”25
Congress aimed to provide a framework to assist tribes with child and
family service programs, not to strip tribes of their governance over
child custody proceedings.26
When drafting ICWA, Congress noted that “there is no resource
that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian
tribes than their children.”27 Nevertheless, Congress found that nontribal public and private agencies were breaking up Indian families by
the often-unwarranted removal of their children at an alarmingly high
rate.28 Equally disturbing was the percentage of Indian children who
were removed from their homes and placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions.29 Congress also found that states, when
exercising jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, “have
often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people

23. Id.
24. Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006)).
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
26. See id.
27. See id. § 1901(3).
28. See id. § 1901(4).
29. Id.
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and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities
and families.”30
Responding to these findings and to accomplish its goal, Congress
established “tribal courts as the required or preferred forum for
adjudication of Indian child custody proceedings.”31 ICWA defines
“tribal court,” in relevant part, as “a court with jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings and which is . . . established and operated under
the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or any other administrative body
of a tribe which is vested with authority over child custody
proceedings.”32 Under ICWA, “child custody proceedings” include
proceedings of foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement.33 ICWA excludes child
placements as a result of criminal behavior or divorce proceedings,34 but
generally it otherwise does not distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary child custody proceedings.35
Establishing tribal courts as the preferred forum for Indian child
custody proceedings, ICWA § 1911, titled “Indian Tribe Jurisdiction over
Indian Child Custody Proceedings,” explicitly limits states’ jurisdiction
over Indian child custody proceedings.36 First, unless jurisdiction is
otherwise vested in a state, ICWA § 1911(a) grants tribal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over “any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.”37
Further, ICWA § 1911(a) also provides that tribal courts “retain
exclusive jurisdiction over tribal court wards regardless of residence or
domicile.”38 Although ICWA does not define the term “ward,” the court
in Tanana stated:
[T]he most commonly accepted understanding of wardship is
that when a tribal court, or a tribal governing council, has
exercised legitimate jurisdiction over an Indian child in a child

30. Id. § 1901(5).
31. See State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 738 (Alaska 2011)
(quoting CONFERENCE OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 571
(4th ed. 2008)).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(12).
33. Id. § 1903(1).
34. Id.
35. See Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that ICWAdefined child custody proceedings “definitely encompass[] both voluntary and
involuntary proceedings”). Some differences between voluntary and
involuntary proceedings do exist, such as in ICWA’s notice requirements. Id. at
1062–63.
36. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911; Tanana, 249 P.3d at 738−39.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
38. Tanana, 249 P.3d at 739.
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custody proceeding and continues to exercise that jurisdiction,
a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction is precluded, except, of
course, on an emergency basis.39
Further limiting states’ jurisdictional reach over Indian child
custody proceedings, ICWA § 1911(b) requires state courts to transfer
jurisdiction to tribal courts over proceedings involving foster care
placement or termination of parental rights of an Indian child not
domiciled or residing in Indian country.40 This must occur upon the
petition of either parent, the Indian custodian, or the Indian child’s tribe,
absent certain findings.41 Likewise, ICWA § 1918, titled “Reassumption
of Jurisdiction over Child Custody Proceedings,” sets forth a process in
which any tribe may petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume
tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings that may have been
transferred to state court.42 Validating tribal court orders and
jurisdiction, ICWA § 1911(d) mandates that states “give full faith and
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian
tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent
that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any other entity.”43
These provisions regulate state-tribal relations in Alaska because
ICWA expressly includes Alaska Natives within its definition of
“Indians” and because Alaska Native villages are expressly recognized
as “Indian tribes” within the meaning of the Act.44 Almost all of the
cases discussed below involve an interpretation of the key provisions of
ICWA.
B.

Public Law No. 83-280

Public Law 280 (P.L. 280) was enacted in 1953, prior to ICWA. P.L.
280 transferred criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands in five
states from the federal government to the states and allowed for future

39. Id. at 739 n.21 (quoting B.J. JONES, MARK TILDEN & KELLY GAINES-STONER,
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 58 (2d ed. 2008)).
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
41. Id. (transferring jurisdiction unless good cause to the contrary is shown,
objection is raised by either parent, or the tribal court declines such a transfer).
42. Id. § 1918(a) (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State
jurisdiction . . . may reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.
Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child custody
proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to
reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such
jurisdiction.”).
43. Id. § 1911(d).
44. Id. § 1903(3), (8).
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assumptions of jurisdictions by all other states.45 Alaska was added to
the list in 1958.46 Congress passed P.L. 280 to address “the complete
breakdown of law and order on many of the Indian reservations.”47 The
Act provided that tribal ordinances and customs not in conflict with
state law be given “full force and effect” in civil causes of action.48 In
1976 the Supreme Court held that, although P.L. 280 provided for
substitution of state for federal judicial forums over some subjects, it did
not confer state “general civil regulatory powers” over Indian lands.49
As will be discussed more fully below, in 1986 the Alaska Supreme
Court interpreted the grant of civil jurisdiction to the states in P.L. 280 as
depriving tribal courts of concurrent jurisdiction.50 In so holding, Alaska
law was put on a direct collision course with federal law,51 and they
would remain at odds until the Tanana decision brought state law fully
into conformity with federal law.

II. HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT CASES: CONFUSION IN THE MID1980S
Throughout the mid-1980s, considerable confusion existed in
Alaska surrounding the law governing state and tribal court jurisdiction
over proceedings involving Alaska Native children. Federal and state
courts were split, both on whether Alaska tribes were federally
recognized and on whether they possessed inherent authority to
adjudicate children’s proceedings.
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered the issue of tribal court
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings in In re J.M.52 There, a child
45. Ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588−89 (1953) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). In extending state jurisdiction to
Indian lands, P.L. 280 expressly exempted from state jurisdiction the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of Indian trust property and the regulation of hunting,
fishing, and trapping rights protected by treaty, statute, or agreement. Id.
46. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (amended by Act of
Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
47. State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235,
and H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 82d Cong. 16 (1952) (statement of Rep. D’Ewart, Member, H.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs).
48. § 4, 67 Stat. at 589 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
49. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 389−90 (1976).
50. See Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 722
P.2d 219, 221 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001);
see also discussion infra Part II.
51. See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559−62
(9th Cir. 1991).
52. 718 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1986).
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protection proceeding was initiated in tribal court and was then
transferred to state court based upon an oral, and subsequently written,
approval by the Tribal Chief.53 The Tribe later filed a motion to dismiss
the state court proceeding, claiming that the Tribal Chief had acted
without authority, that the Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction under §
1911(a) of ICWA,54 and that its jurisdiction had not properly been
relinquished to the State.55 The Alaska Supreme Court agreed that the
Chief’s actions did not constitute a sufficiently clear waiver of tribal
jurisdiction, and therefore, the court directed that the case be remanded
to the tribal court.56 The court noted that “[t]o imply a waiver of
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the ICWA objective of
encouraging tribal control over custody decisions affecting Indian
children.”57
That same year, in Native Village of Nenana v. State, Department of
Health & Social Services, the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether a
state court may transfer jurisdiction over an Indian child custody
proceeding involving an out-of-village child to the child’s tribal court
under ICWA § 1911(b).58 Interpreting ICWA §§ 1911(b) and 1918(a), the
court ruled against such transfers, suggesting that tribal courts in Alaska
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody proceedings.59 In
addressing this question, the Alaska Supreme Court construed ICWA
and P.L. 280 and held that the latter effectively divested tribal
jurisdiction and granted state courts exclusive jurisdiction in children’s
proceedings.60 In so ruling, the court relied heavily on its reading of
ICWA § 1918, which mentions P.L. 280. The court concluded that it was
Congress’ intent that P.L. 280 give states exclusive, rather than
concurrent, jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, unless
and until a tribe petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to reassume
exclusive jurisdiction and such petition was approved.61 The court
further held that an Alaska tribe could not exercise transfer jurisdiction
over ICWA proceedings (securing transfer of cases from state courts

53. Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 152. § 1911(a) states in relevant part: “Where an Indian child is a
ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)
(2006).
55. J.M., 718 P.2d at 152.
56. Id. at 156.
57. Id. at 155.
58. 722 P.2d 219, 220 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849
(Alaska 2001).
59. Id. at 222.
60. Id. at 221.
61. Id.
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under ICWA § 1911(b)) until it successfully petitioned the Secretary of
the Interior for the right to “reassume” such jurisdiction under ICWA §
1918(a).62
In In re K.E., the Alaska Supreme Court again addressed whether a
tribe could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over child protection matters
pursuant to § 1911(a).63 The Tribe argued that Nenana did not govern the
resolution of the case because the Tribe’s jurisdiction was being
exercised pursuant to § 1911(a)’s provisions governing children
domiciled with a tribe, rather than the state-to-tribe transfer provision of
ICWA § 1911(b) at issue in Nenana.64 The court rejected this argument,
finding: (1) § 1918(a)’s reassumption provision “makes no distinction”
between the two types of situations; (2) Nenana was the “controlling
authority”; and (3) “in either case a tribe must present a petition to the
Secretary” under ICWA § 1918.65 The following year, in Native Village of
Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, the Alaska Supreme Court
went further and held that Alaska tribes were “not [to] be treated as
sovereigns.”66
In the 1990s the Alaska Supreme Court was confronted with a
growing body of contrary federal court rulings that prompted
reconsideration of the Nenana-K.E decisions. In In re F.P., the court
revisited its Nenana holding in light of the intervening Ninth Circuit
decision in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska.67 In Venetie,
the Ninth Circuit had held that tribal jurisdiction survived P.L. 280.68
The Ninth Circuit explained that the reassumption provision in ICWA §
1918(a) was designed only to authorize a tribe to enlarge upon the
inherent and concurrent jurisdiction that had survived P.L. 280, to
either: (1) re-secure its pre-P.L. 280 exclusive jurisdiction or (2) avail
itself of ICWA’s mandatory transfer jurisdiction.69 So ruling, the Ninth
Circuit had upheld the Venetie Tribe’s concurrent jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings without the need to follow ICWA § 1918(a)’s
petition procedures.70
In In re F.P., the Alaska Supreme Court remained unconvinced that
its Nenana-K.E. approach should be revisited. The court’s principal
62. Id.
63. 744 P.2d 1173, 1173 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam), overruled by In re C.R.H.,
29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
64. Id. at 1174.
65. Id. at 1174−75.
66. 757 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1988).
67. 843 P.2d 1214, 1215−16 (Alaska 1992) (per curiam), overruled by In re
C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
68. 944 F.2d 548, 561−62 (9th Cir. 1991).
69. Id.; see also supra Part I.A and discussion infra Part IV.A.
70. See Venetie, 944 F.2d at 561−62.
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reason for adhering to its prior decisions was that the court in Stevens
had concluded that there were generally no federally recognized tribes
in Alaska at all, making discussions about inherent jurisdiction
academic.71 Although the court was not yet prepared to revisit Stevens,
Chief Justice Rabinowitz was persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Venetie.72 In his dissent, he argued that Nenana and K.E.
should be overruled based on the reasoning that P.L. 280 leaves tribal
court jurisdiction intact, so that its extension of jurisdiction to states
leaves tribes with concurrent adjudicatory jurisdiction.73 Although the
Chief Justice represented the minority view in F.P., later developments
vindicated his view.

III. FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF ALASKA’S TRIBES
A.

All Federal Branches Recognize Tribes in Alaska

Nenana, K.E., and Stevens put pressure on the federal government to
clarify the status of Alaska tribes. In the ensuing years the Executive
Branch,74 Congress,75 and the federal courts76 all expressly confirmed
that Alaska’s tribes are federally recognized sovereigns with inherent
sovereign authority to adjudicate children’s proceedings. This express
recognition of Alaska tribes by the federal government put the State of
Alaska in what it called an “untenable” position:
[T]he conflict between [the Alaska Supreme Court’s] rulings in
[Nenana] and its progeny, and the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in [Venetie] has left the
71. 843 P.2d at 1215 (“Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups
not be treated as sovereigns.” (quoting Stevens, 757 P.2d at 34)).
72. See id. at 1216 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,180, 68,180−84 (Dec. 5,
2003) (listing federally recognized tribes); Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67
Fed. Reg. 46,328, 46,328−33 (July 12, 2002); Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 65
Fed. Reg. 13,298, 13,299−302 (Mar. 13, 2000); Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 60
Fed. Reg. 9250, 9251−55 (Feb. 16, 1995); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible
to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg.
54,364, 54,366−69 (Oct. 21, 1993).
75. See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 479a1 (2006); see also supra note 2.
76. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding Alaska Native Villages that are modern-day successors
to sovereign historical bands of natives may grant adoptions of children).
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State in an untenable position. On the one hand, it must abide by
the law of this state as determined by this court; on the other,
its failure to follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation as it
relates to any villages other than those involved in [Venetie] has
resulted in repeated suits filed by tribes in federal court,
challenging the State’s inability to recognize tribal court orders.
These suits have tied up the lives of the affected persons, particularly
delaying permanent placements for children, and have diverted state
resources from necessary state services. The State wants to
cooperate more closely with tribes, avoiding duplicative
programs and stretching our combined resources further than
either could manage separately, particularly in the underserved regions of Alaska.77
The result was a dramatic shift in state court jurisprudence.
B.

The Alaska Supreme Court Decision in John v. Baker

John v. Baker involved a custody dispute between two parents.78 In
its landmark decision in this case, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed
whether tribal courts possess jurisdiction over non-ICWA child custody
cases arising outside of Indian country.79 Since the case did not involve
ICWA, it was not controlled by the express “Alaska” provisions
contained in ICWA’s definitional sections. The case therefore squarely
presented the question of whether inherent tribal sovereignty existed in
Alaska at all, together with the question of whether Alaska tribes
possess original jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody disputes in their
own courts.80 This time, the court was persuaded to follow federal law,
accepting that Alaska tribes were federally recognized sovereign entities
(thereby reversing Stevens) and embracing the core premise “that tribal
sovereignty, with respect to issues of tribal self-governance, exists unless
divested.”81 In its ensuing analysis, the court explained:
Congress has recognized that a tribe has a strong interest in
“preserving and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring
of its own future.” Because [the] Village’s status as a federally
recognized tribe is undisputed and its adjudication of child
custody disputes over member children is necessary “to protect
77. Amicus Brief of the State of Alaska at 1, John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738
(Alaska 1999) (No. S-8099), 1998 WL 35180190, at *1 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
78. 982 P.2d 738, 743 (Alaska 1999).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 752.
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tribal self-government or to control internal relations,” its tribal
courts require no express congressional delegation of the right to
determine custody of tribal children.82
The court then evaluated federal statutes affecting Alaska Natives,
including both ICWA and P.L. 280, to determine whether Congress
explicitly revoked the inherent sovereignty that Alaska Native tribes
possess.83 With respect to ICWA, the court observed that:
ICWA’s goal was to increase tribal control over custody
decisions involving tribal children. Congress viewed this
increased control as vital to the continued sovereignty of the
tribes. In the legislative history to ICWA, Congress cited with
approval a decision stating that “there can be no greater threat
to ‘essential tribal relations,’ and no greater infringement on the
right of the . . . tribe to govern themselves than to interfere with
tribal control over the custody of their children.” Alaska Native
villages are explicitly included within ICWA’s scope.
ICWA’s very structure presumes both that the tribes covered
by the Act are capable of adjudicating child custody matters in
their own courts and that tribal justice systems are appropriate
forums for resolution of child custody disputes. Indeed,
legislative history reveals that ICWA’s jurisdictional
framework was motivated by concerns over the “failure of
State officials, agencies, and procedures to take into account the
special problems and circumstances of Indian families . . . .”84
Although the custody dispute in question in John fell outside of
ICWA’s scope, the court found significant that “Congress’s purpose in
enacting ICWA reveals its intent that Alaska Native villages retain their
power to adjudicate child custody disputes.”85
With respect to P.L. 280, the court noted that this enactment only
has relevance in “Indian country.”86 The court then reasoned that since
there is little “Indian country” in Alaska after Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government,87 P.L. 280 “has limited application in
Alaska.”88 That is, if a village does not occupy “Indian country . . . P.L.
280 has no direct relevance” to its jurisdiction.89 Although this statement
82. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 753.
84. Id. at 753−54 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 754.
86. Id.
87. 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (holding that lands conveyed to Alaska Natives
under ANCSA do not constitute Indian country).
88. John, 982 P.2d at 747.
89. Id. at 748.

MILLER.FINAL.PROOFCHANGES (DO NOT DELETE)

230

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/1/2011 8:35 AM

VOL. 28:2

appeared to overrule much of the court’s earlier reasoning in Nenana, the
court’s failure to say so left Nenana’s continuing vitality unknown.
The Alaska Supreme Court next assessed whether Alaska tribes
retain non-territorial sovereignty that includes original jurisdiction over
child custody disputes, given the absence of “Indian country” and the
intervening ANSCA.90 Carefully reviewing United States Supreme
Court precedent, the court concluded that “the nature of tribal
sovereignty stems from two intertwined sources: tribal membership and
tribal land.”91 The court reasoned that membership-based jurisdiction
exists irrespective of a tribal territory (or “Indian country”) and includes
the power to adjudicate internal child custody disputes.92
After holding that tribal sovereign status, alone, includes the power
to adjudicate matters involving the welfare of tribal children, the court
affirmed tribal court jurisdiction and concluded that Alaska’s state
courts, correspondingly, retain concurrent (but not exclusive)
jurisdiction over such matters.93
C.

The State’s Response and Continued Confusion

In the year following the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in John,
then-Governor Knowles issued Administrative Order 186.94 Governor
Knowles acknowledged the legal and political existence of Alaska’s
federally-recognized tribes, and he directed Alaska’s Executive Branch
to work thereafter on a government-to-government basis with Alaska’s
tribes as sovereigns.95 In doing so, Governor Knowles “acknowledged
the value of the ‘services that Alaska’s [t]ribes contribute to the state’s
economic and social well-being by virtue of their direct [t]ribal authority
and responsibility for the delivery of social, economic, cultural, and
other programs and services.’”96 The order further “committed the State

90. Id. at 754.
91. Id. (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
92. Id. at 754. The court noted that federal case law supports the court’s
conclusion that “federal tribes derive the power to adjudicate internal domestic
matters, including child custody disputes over tribal children, from a source of
sovereignty independent of the land they occupy.” Id.
93. Id. at 759−60.
94. Administrative
Order
No.
186,
Sept.
29,
2000,
http://gov.state.ak.us/admin-orders/186.html; see generally CASE & VOLUCK,
supra note 5, at 430−31 & n.409 (describing Governor Knowles’s actions and
noting change from former policy).
95. Administrative Order No. 186, supra note 94.
96. State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 744 (Alaska 2011)
(alterations in original) (quoting Administrative Order No. 186, supra note 94).
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‘to working with [t]ribes to further strengthen Alaska’s ability to meet
the needs of Alaska’s communities and families.’”97
Despite these developments, some confusion over Alaska’s ability
to coordinate with tribes continued to exist. Such confusion persisted
primarily due to the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court in John never
directly overruled Nenana: Nenana was an ICWA case, whereas the
specific issue in John was whether the Tribe possessed inherent original
jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-parental custody disputes and thus was
not a “child custody proceeding.”98 Further, while P.L. 280 was central
in Nenana, it was deemed irrelevant in John.99

IV. ALASKA SUPREME COURT OVERRULES NENANA IN IN RE
C.R.H.
Two years later, in In re C.R.H., the Alaska Supreme Court was
squarely faced with its prior ICWA holdings.100 There, the State opposed
a motion made under ICWA § 1911(b) to transfer a child custody
proceeding from state court to tribal court.101 The State explained that its
opposition to the transfer stemmed from the fact that, despite the State’s
own earlier request in John that the court overrule Nenana and similar
cases, the court had not yet done so.102 Therefore, the State argued, it
was “constrained, as is this court, to follow [those cases] until the Alaska
Supreme Court overrules these decisions.”103 The State then filed a brief
urging the Alaska Supreme Court to confirm that Alaska tribes could
hear cases transferred from state court to tribal court without the tribes
first petitioning the Secretary to “reassume” such jurisdiction under
ICWA § 1918.104 The Alaska Supreme Court agreed.
A.

The Alaska Supreme Court’s Holding in In re C.R.H.

First, the court in In re C.R.H. explicitly overruled the actual
holding of Nenana and its progeny and upheld the right of Alaska tribes
to secure transfer jurisdiction under ICWA § 1911(b), irrespective of any

97. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Administrative Order No. 186, supra
note 94).
98. John, 982 P.2d at 746.
99. Id. at 747.
100. 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 851.
103. Id.
104. Appellee State of Alaska’s Brief at 8−32, In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska
2001) (No. S-9677).

MILLER.FINAL.PROOFCHANGES (DO NOT DELETE)

232

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/1/2011 8:35 AM

VOL. 28:2

reassumption of jurisdiction under ICWA § 1918.105 Second, the court in
C.R.H. rejected Nenana’s analytic linkage between P.L. 280 and a tribe’s
membership-based (and non-Indian country) concurrent jurisdiction
over child custody cases.106 Instead, the court held that ICWA § 1911(b)
transfer jurisdiction, by its own terms, authorizes transfer of jurisdiction
to tribal courts regardless of P.L. 280:
[ICWA’s] language makes clear [that] Congress intended P.L.
280 to affect tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction under subsection
1911(a), but did not intend P.L. 280 to affect transfer
jurisdiction under subsection 1911(b). Subsection 1911(a) grants
tribes exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving children who
reside on reservations “except where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the State by existing Federal law” such as P.L. 280. With
this qualifying language, Congress recognized P.L. 280 as a
limitation on exclusive tribal jurisdiction. By contrast, in
subsection 1911(b), Congress did not articulate a P.L. 280
exception to tribal transfer jurisdiction. Rather, it provided that
“in any State court proceeding . . . the court, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the
jurisdiction of the tribe.” Subsection 1911(b) therefore
authorizes transfer to tribal courts regardless of whether or
how P.L. 280 otherwise affects the tribes’ jurisdiction.107
From this perspective, the court affirmed that the burden of
establishing good cause to deny transfer jurisdiction rests on the party
opposing the transfer, observing that:
The good cause exception—like the comity analysis discussed
in John v. Baker—”is not an invitation for our courts to deny
recognition to tribal [courts] based on paternalistic notions of
proper procedure. . . . [S]uperior courts should strive to respect
the cultural differences that influence tribal jurisprudence, as
well as to recognize the practical limits experienced by smaller
court systems.”108

105. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 850 (“We overrule Nenana and subsequent decisions
affirming its holding to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with today’s
decision.”).
106. Id. at 852 (“The language and structure of section 1911 reflect
congressional intent that all tribes, regardless of their P.L. 280 status, be able to
accept transfer jurisdiction of ICWA cases from state courts.”).
107. Id. at 852−53 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 854 (alterations in original) (quoting John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738,
763 (Alaska 1999)).
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In sum, John and C.R.H. upheld several fundamental propositions
that directly overruled Nenana and its progeny: (1) Alaska tribes are
inherent sovereigns possessed with original jurisdiction over their
members;109 (2) tribal status gives rise to membership-based jurisdiction
that does not require tribal territory;110 (3) the original jurisdiction of
tribes over their members includes the power to adjudicate matters
relating to their members;111 (4) tribal authority over members continues
unless explicitly extinguished by Congress (and such extinguishment
did not occur in ANCSA or in ICWA);112 (5) P.L. 280 extends only to
“Indian country” within the state;113 and (6) outside Indian country,
which is to say in most of Alaska, state courts have concurrent, but not
exclusive, jurisdiction with tribes over children’s proceedings involving
tribal children.114
B.

The Effect of In re C.R.H.

Responding to these rapid developments in Alaska Supreme Court
jurisprudence, Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services
(DHSS) requested an opinion from then-Attorney General Bruce Botelho
regarding the effect of C.R.H.115 Responding to this request, the Alaska
Department of Law issued a memorandum explaining that C.R.H. had
overruled Nenana and its progeny.116 The Department of Law added:
“Thus, state law now recognizes that tribes in Alaska have authority
over child custody matters involving tribal children and need not
petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume jurisdiction before
exercising their authority.”117 The memorandum explained that “the
State was required to ‘recognize tribal court adoption orders to the

109. John, 982 P.2d at 750−52; C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 851 n.5.
110. John, 982 P.2d at 754−59 (holding Alaska Tribes retain fundamental,
sovereign power to adjudicate “internal family law affairs” like “child custody”).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 753.
113. Id. at 747; C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 851, 852 & n.9.
114. John, 982 P.2d at 759−61, 765. In terms of retained original tribal
sovereignty, there is no meaningful distinction between custody contests as
between parents, and jurisdiction over “child custody proceedings” such as
those covered by ICWA; both categories of cases involve the welfare of member
children and fall within tribal subject matter jurisdiction. In both situations,
tribal jurisdiction is necessary “to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations.” Id. at 752.
115. Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Donna Goldsmith for Jay
Livey, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. Comm’r 1 (Mar. 29, 2002) (No. 441-00-0005)
[hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum], revoked by RENKES OPINION, supra note 13.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 1−2.
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extent that it recognize[d] such orders from sister states and other
foreign orders’ because ‘C.R.H. removed all impediments that
historically prevented [recognition of] tribal court adoptions.’”118
Simultaneously, the State settled a lawsuit brought against it by the
Sitka Tribe and two parents who had adopted a child in that tribe’s
court.119 In the settlement’s Conclusions of Law, the State stipulated in
paragraph two that the Sitka Tribe “has jurisdiction over custody cases
arising under the Indian Child Welfare Act despite the facts that the
Tribe has not petitioned for reassumption of jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings under ICWA § 1918 and did not acquire the
case by transfer from state court.”120 The State also acknowledged that
“§ 1918 does not affect the obligation of the state to give full faith and
credit to the judicial proceedings of an Indian tribe applicable to Indian
child custody proceedings covered by the Indian Child Welfare Act.”121
Consistent with these developments, the DHSS Office of Children’s
Services (OCS) adopted a policy for sharing non-emergency reports of
harm with a tribe when the tribe had an ongoing child protection case.122

V. THE RENKES OPINION AND ITS ABRUPT SHIFT IN POLICY
In fall of 2004, DHSS policy and protocol abruptly changed. On
October 1, 2004, the new Attorney General, Gregg Renkes, issued an
opinion (Renkes Opinion) expressly revoking the 2002 Department of
Law Memorandum.123 Relying on Nenana, the Renkes Opinion
concluded that, notwithstanding C.R.H., Alaska state courts continue to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving
Alaska Native children and that Alaska Native tribes do not possess any
jurisdiction to hear children’s cases unless (1) the child’s tribe has
successfully petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to reassume
jurisdiction under ICWA § 1918, or (2) an Alaska Superior Court judge
has transferred jurisdiction over a child’s case to a tribal court in
accordance with ICWA § 1911(b).124 Absent these circumstances, the

118. State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746 (Alaska 2011)
(alterations in original) (quoting Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 115, at 5).
119. Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State, No. 1SI-01-61 CI (Apr. 1, 2002) (agreeing
that the DHSS Bureau of Vital Statistics would issue new birth certificates to
honor tribal-court adoptions).
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id.
122. Cf. Tanana, 249 P.3d at 747 (describing the changes to previous OCS
protocols).
123. See RENKES OPINION, supra note 13, at 2 n.3.
124. Id. The Renkes Opinion simply ignored the State’s own contrary
representations in its John v. Baker amicus brief and in the Sitka Tribe settlement,
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Renkes Opinion concluded that tribal court decrees are not entitled to
full faith and credit under ICWA: “full faith and credit is not due to
tribal court adoption decrees because Alaska tribal courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian child adoptions.”125
Continuing the about-face in state policy, the Renkes Opinion
directed state social workers to stop sharing confidential information
with tribes in children’s cases and to investigate all reports of harm the
State received pertaining to Alaska Native children, irrespective of a
tribe’s claim of exclusive jurisdiction under an established tribal court
wardship order.126 The Renkes Opinion cautioned that only two Alaska
tribes (the Native Villages of Barrow and Chevak) were currently
approved to exercise ICWA jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
because they had submitted to the ICWA § 1918 reassumption petition
process.127 OCS was expressly instructed to obey the guidance provided
in the Renkes Opinion and to draft regulations consistent with that
opinion.128
Complying with these instructions, OCS deleted section 2.1.3 B of
the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual, which governed the protocol for
handling non-emergency reports of harm when a tribe has an ongoing
child protection case. In contrast to the 2002 edition of the OCS Manual,
which stated that “until a child custody proceeding is initiated, ‘the tribe
and the [S]tate simultaneously share authority and either government
may take the steps necessary to protect a child who may be at risk[,]’ the
2004 edition removed that provision and otherwise limited concurrent
jurisdiction to cases transferred from state court.”129 Further, OCS
altered the manner in which information was shared between the State
and tribes. Prior to the Renkes Opinion, “OCS contacted a child’s tribe
‘[a]s soon as possible, and if possible, prior to the assignment for
investigation’ to ascertain whether the tribe already had custody of the
child or wanted to take jurisdiction over a child protection

and it only hinted at the position the State took in the C.R.H. appeal. Id. at 6
(“Although urged to do so by the parties, the court in C.R.H. did not hold that
tribes in Alaska retain concurrent jurisdiction with the state in child protection
matters involving Indian children.” (first emphasis added)). Its single peripheral
reference to John v. Baker failed to mention that case’s central holding about tribal
inherent jurisdiction over tribal children. Id. at 28 n.75.
125. Id. at 30.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id. at 11 n.23.
128. Id. at 31.
129. State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746−47 (Alaska 2011) (first
alteration in original) (quoting the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual). When
revising its manual, OCS cited the Renkes Opinion as authority. Id. at 746.
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proceeding.”130 After the Renkes Opinion, OCS only
information to a tribe if the tribe was considered to be
exercising its jurisdiction and if state court proceedings had
initiated.131 The changes that took place were described by
supervisor this way:

VOL. 28:2
released
properly
yet to be
one OCS

Policies have changed recently regarding when we contact the
tribe in investigations . . . . [W]e don’t share information
regarding investigations unless the investigation is underway.
In other words, . . . the tribe can’t have access to allegations that
are made unless I have releases from my clients. They can’t get
copies of Reports of Harm unless . . . the parent in the Report of
Harm has signed a release. Until [the tribes] have intervened
legally in a [child in need of aid] case. In which case, then, they
get all that.132
In addition to OCS, BVS also changed its policies and procedures to
conform to the Renkes Opinion. For example:
According to a letter from BVS to the Kaltag Tribal Council,
BVS began refusing to accept tribal court adoption paperwork
in October 2005 unless it was from Native Village of Barrow,
Native Village of Chevak, or Metlakatla Indian Community,
and it began processing only cultural adoptions for the
remaining tribes.133
In the wake of the State’s abrupt reversal of policy, tribes and their
individual members across Alaska suffered immediate impacts.134 First,
the changes created a cloud of uncertainty over numerous tribal court
placements of children.135 Second, the Renkes Opinion increased
jurisdictional conflict among tribal and state authorities. This
uncertainty was felt by all Indian children in child custody proceedings
and their adoptive parents.136 Typical was the case of one member child
of the Kenaitze Tribe, as discussed by the Court in Tanana:
The child had been: (1) the subject of several emergency
petitions before the Tribe; (2) the subject of multiple reports of
harm OCS had transferred to the Tribe for follow-up; and (3)
held by a state court to be under the tribal court’s jurisdiction.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 747 (quoting the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual).
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
See id. at 749.
See id.
Id.
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OCS disregarded this previous activity and reopened its
investigation, requesting a state court order compelling the
child’s attendance at an interview regarding allegations the
Tribe had already investigated and found unsubstantiated.137
Similarly, when tribal court workers requested birth certificates
from BVS, they were told that the State no longer recognized tribal court
jurisdiction, and therefore birth certificates would not be issued unless
done pursuant to the procedures developed for cultural adoptions.138
Furthermore, when tribal court administrators requested information
from OCS personnel concerning certain children, the requests were
denied on the basis that the State no longer recognizes tribal court
authority in Alaska.139

VI. KALTAG AND TANANA LITIGATION
A.

Federal and State Suits Challenging the Renkes Opinion and Its
Policies

Shortly after the Renkes Opinion and its policy changes went into
effect, a suit was brought in state court on behalf of the Native Village of
Tanana, Nulato Village, the Village of Kalskag, the Akiak Native
Community, the Village of Lower Kalskag, and the Kenaitze Indian
Tribe.140 Each of the Tribes have active tribal courts that exercise original
jurisdiction over member children on the basis of their inherent
sovereign authority, and none had petitioned the Secretary of the
Interior to reassume exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to ICWA § 1918.141
In addition to the Tribes, a suit was also brought on behalf of Dan and
Theresa Schwietert (the Schwieterts), a non-Native couple who adopted

137. Id. at 749 n.118 (referencing the Tribes’ argument that there is a real case
and controversy ripe for adjudication based on the facts that in response to the
Renkes Opinion, OCS changed its policy, and the record reflects the application
of the new policy).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 748 (“Indian children may be at risk of harm because of the
State’s refusal to coordinate and cooperate with tribes regarding reports of harm;
Indian children, as well as their natural and putative adoptive parents, may be
held in legal limbo by the State’s refusal to give full faith and credit to tribal
adoption decrees; and both the State and tribal courts need to understand the
extent to which tribal court orders in ‘child custody proceedings,’ as the term is
defined in ICWA, are entitled to full faith and credit.”).
140. Id. at 736.
141. Id. at 736, 739 n.24.
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a special-needs Alaska Native child through the Tanana Tribal Court in
June 2004 and who received a birth certificate from the State.142
The Tribes and the Schwieterts sought a declaratory judgment that
Alaska tribes possess inherent sovereign authority over the domestic
relations of their tribal members and therefore possess adjudicatory
jurisdiction, concurrent with the State, over children’s proceedings
without first petitioning the Secretary of the Interior under ICWA §
1918.143 In 2005, Superior Court Judge Suddock denied the State’s
motion to dismiss on ripeness grounds, stating:
[T]he tribal courts are behaving as if they have original
jurisdiction in these matters. They are actually adjudicating
them and they are placing children based on them and the
[S]tate is here saying . . . [“]that’s void. Those courts are [a]
nullity. Any of those parents could go get those children back
and not be in violation of a binding court order because it’s
void ab initio.[“] Strikes me that that’s a bad situation, that
there is a very ripe question for a review: whether or not the
Attorney General ever put pencil to paper . . . there is a
network of tribal courts out there that has assumed a
jurisdiction beyond . . . what the [S]tate contends is proper.
Ordinary citizens are being affected. Children are being
affected. It seems that there is a ripe question for declaratory
judgment.144
On August 26, 2008, Superior Court Judge Tan issued a declaratory
judgment in favor of the Tribes and the Schwieterts, after which the
State of Alaska appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.145
While the Tanana state court case was proceeding, the Kaltag Tribal
Council and Hudson and Salina Sam (the Sams) filed suit in federal
district court challenging the State of Alaska’s refusal to recognize the
Sams’ adoption decree from the Kaltag Tribal Court.146 Kaltag and the
Sams sought a judgment that the State was required to give full faith
142. Id. at 736 n.6.
143. Id. at 736.
144. Id. at 737 (alterations in original) (quoting Superior Court Judge John
Suddock denying the State’s dismissal motion from the bench in March 2005).
145. Id.
146. Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, No. 3:06-cv-00211-TMB, at 1 (D. Alaska
filed Feb. 22, 2008) (“As of October 25, 2005, the Bureau [of Vital Statistics] will
only be accepting Tribal Court granted adoption paperwork from the following
3 entities: Barrow, Chevak, and Metlakatla. All other tribal entities will need to
submit the Cultural Adoption packet in order for the Bureau to process the
adoption.” (quoting letter to Kaltag Tribal Council from the Bureau of Vital
Statistics refusing to recognize the Sams’ adoption decree made by the Tribe’s
court)), aff’d, 344 Fed. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010).
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and credit to the Kaltag Tribal Court’s adoption decree pursuant to
ICWA’s full faith and credit clause.147 Like the Ninth Circuit some
twenty years earlier in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska,148
the federal district court agreed.149 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
that Indian country or reservation status is not a requirement for a tribe
to exercise member-based jurisdiction because a “Tribe’s authority over
its reservation or Indian country is incidental to its authority over its
members.”150 The State of Alaska’s petition for certiorari was denied by
the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 2010.151
B.

The Alaska Supreme Court’s Holding in State v. Native Village of
Tanana

On March 4, 2011, the Alaska Supreme Court issued its decision in
the Tanana case. In a carefully written opinion, the court addressed two
issues: (1) whether the inherent sovereign jurisdiction of Alaska Native
tribes recognized in John v. Baker includes the initiation of “child custody
proceedings” as the term is used in ICWA; and (2) if so, whether those
proceedings are entitled to full faith and credit by the State.152
The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing ICWA,
Alaska and federal case law regarding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty
over ICWA-defined “child custody proceedings,” John v. Baker, and the
State’s reaction to John v. Baker both prior to and after October 1, 2004.153
After reviewing John v. Baker’s tribal jurisdiction analysis, the court
reiterated four main points to “set the stage for . . . consideration of the
State’s arguments.”154 First, the court acknowledged that, absent an
explicit divestment by Congress, all federally recognized tribes retain
sovereignty and inherent authority “to regulate internal domestic
relations among [their] members.”155 Second, although ANSCA
eliminated nearly all Indian country in Alaska, it “did not divest
federally-recognized sovereign Alaska Native tribes of their authority to

147. Id. at 5.
148. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
149. Kaltag, No. 3:06-cv-00211-TMB, at 12 (“The Kaltag court’s adoption
orders are entitled to full faith and credit, and the Bureau [of Vital Statistics]
shall grant said status to the adoption order by issuing the Sams a substitute
birth certificate.”).
150. Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, 344 F. App’x 324, 325 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Venetie, 944 F.2d at 559 n.12), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010).
151. Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010).
152. State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 735 (Alaska 2011).
153. Id. at 738.
154. Id. at 750.
155. Id. (citing John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 751 (Alaska 1999)).
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regulate internal domestic relations among their members.”156 Third,
ambiguities in statutes that affect the rights of Native Americans must
be construed in favor of Native Americans and the court “will not
lightly find that Congress intended to eliminate the sovereign powers of
Alaska tribes.”157 Fourth, Congress enacted ICWA with the intent that
“‘Alaska Native villages retain their power to adjudicate child custody
disputes’ and ‘ICWA’s very structure presumes both that the tribes . . .
are capable of adjudicating child custody matters . . . and that tribal
justice systems are appropriate forums for resolution of child custody
disputes.’”158
After reiterating these four fundamental principles, the court
addressed the State’s argument that ICWA § 1911 constitutes a
“complete jurisdictional scheme” reflecting “Congress’[s] reasonable
balancing of tribal rights, parental rights off-reservation, and state rights
off-reservation.”159 From the State’s perspective, the acknowledgment of
inherent sovereign jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings:
(1) fundamentally upend[s] ICWA’s delicate balance of
parental, state, and tribal interests; (2) circumvents transfer
jurisdiction limitations; (3) allows tribes to exercise jurisdiction
over non-members; and (4) magnifies the disjunction in Indian
law that P.L. 280 may have divested Alaska Native tribal
powers inside Indian country but not outside.160
Rejecting the State’s claims, the court agreed with the Tribes that
“ICWA creates limitations on states’ jurisdiction over ICWA-defined
child custody proceedings, not limitations on tribes’ jurisdiction over
those proceedings.”161 The court then expressly overruled what
remained of its earlier holding in Nenana.162 In so doing the court
acknowledged:
In the nearly 25 years since our Nenana decision, our view of
P.L. 280’s impact on tribal jurisdiction has become the minority
view—other courts and commentators have instead concluded
that P.L. 280 merely gives states concurrent jurisdiction with
tribes in Indian country. What remains of Nenana must now be
overruled.163

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. (citing John, 982 P.2d at 753).
Id. (quoting John, 982 P.2d at 753−54).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting John, 982 P.2d at 753−54).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 750−51 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 751.
Id.
Id.
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The court then adopted the position that P.L. 280 did not divest
Alaska Native tribes of their jurisdiction under ICWA § 1911(a) but
instead created concurrent jurisdiction with the state.164 Further, the
court held that “federally recognized Alaska Native tribes that have not
reassumed exclusive jurisdiction under [ICWA] § 1918(a) still have
concurrent jurisdiction to initiate ICWA-defined child custody
proceedings, both inside and outside of Indian country.”165 Upon this
foundation, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the inherent
sovereignty of Alaska Native tribes, entitled to all rights and privileges
granted in ICWA, including procedural due process safeguards imposed
on states.166 Accordingly, the court held that ICWA’s full faith and credit
clause mandates that the State recognize all Alaska Native tribal court
orders in ICWA-defined child custody proceedings in the same manner
that the State gives full faith and credit to orders of other state courts
and foreign courts.167
The Tanana decision brings a welcome level of clarity to an area
that had been hotly contested for over two decades. But, the court was
careful to limit its decision to the facts before it, and it declined to
address additional issues concerning tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers.168

VII. REMAINING AMBIGUITIES IN THE LAW
In its briefing, the State requested that the court delineate
limitations on an Alaska Native tribe’s inherent jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings when the proceeding touches upon the rights of
parents who are either non-Native or who are Native but members of
another tribe. The court declined the invitation but noted that the nature
and extent of tribal jurisdiction in any particular case will be based upon
the following factors: “(1) the extent of the federal recognition of a
particular tribe as sovereign; (2) the extent of the tribe’s authority under
its organic laws; (3) the tribe’s delegation of authority to its tribal court;
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2006) (requiring notice to Indian tribes); id.
§ 1911(b) (providing Indian tribes with right to petition for transfer to tribal
court); id. § 1911(c) (providing Indian tribes with right to intervene); JONES,
TILDEN & GAINES-STONER, supra note 39, at 83−111).
167. Id. at 751 & n.129 (citing John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 761−62 (Alaska
1999) (“ICWA requires courts to extend full faith and credit to tribal court
decisions involving ‘child custody proceedings’ as that term is defined by
[ICWA].”)).
168. Id. at 749.
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and (4) the proper exercise of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.”169 Noting that it did not have sufficient facts before it to
make such determinations, the court left those questions to be addressed
another day in the context of specific factual scenarios.170
The court specifically stated:
Among the many issues we are not deciding today are: (1)
whether, parallel to ICWA § 1911(b) transfer jurisdiction
limitations, parents of Indian children might have the right to
object to tribal jurisdiction; (2) the extent of tribal jurisdiction
over non-member parents of Indian children; and (3) the extent
of tribal jurisdiction over Indian children or member parents
who have limited or no contact with the tribe.171
Without a factual context, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the
three remaining issues left undecided in Tanana. For future litigants,
however, a potential answer to each question is best discerned by
reference to ICWA.
With respect to the parental objections to tribal court jurisdiction,
that notion springs from ICWA’s provision permitting a parental veto
over ICWA’s mandatory state court-to-tribal court transfer provision.172
In ICWA Congress set out to enhance and strengthen tribal interests, not
to curtail them.173 As a result, there is no statutory foundation for
construing ICWA’s limitation on court-to-court transfers as a limitation
on the exercise of inherent tribal jurisdiction. Inherent tribal jurisdiction
is not rooted in ICWA. Not surprisingly, in thirty years no court has
ever relied on subsection 1911(b)’s court-to-court parental veto provision
to create a new limitation on the inherent authority of tribal courts to
protect tribal children when initiating child protection cases.
As for jurisdictional questions, nothing in ICWA impacts the right
of any parent (or any other litigant, for that matter) to raise personal or
other jurisdictional objections before a tribal court. To the extent a tribal
court acts in derogation of a parent’s due process rights, the resulting
decree will not be entitled to full faith and credit or comity
recognition.174

169. Id. at 751−52.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 752.
172. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2006).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85.
174. See Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 55 (Alaska 2008) (“Full faith and credit
also requires that the issuing court afford the parties due process and render its
judgment in accordance with federal and state constitutional standards.”); Evans
v. Native Vill. of Selawik IRA Council, 65 P.3d 58, 60 (Alaska 2003); John v.
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The issue of personal jurisdiction over a non-member parent is best
discerned from ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme, which appropriately
focuses on the status of the child at the heart of any court proceeding
and not the identities of other parties (or potential parties).175 Similarly,
state law provides an exception to personal jurisdiction of an absent or
non-consenting parent based on the “status exception” of a child in a
custody proceeding.176 When a child is a tribal member, typically one or
both parents will be members too.177 Neither tribal jurisdiction under
ICWA §§ 1911(a) and (b), nor ICWA § 1911(d)’s requirement to extend
full faith and credit to tribal proceedings, is subject to an exception
based on the membership status of a party other than the child.
Finally, ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme does not distinguish between
those tribal children who have significant contacts with their member
tribe and those who do not. By its terms, ICWA applies to any Indian
child who is a “member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe,” notwithstanding a tribe’s contacts with the child.178
Nonetheless, “minimum contacts” is a constitutional prerequisite for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction in state and federal fora.179 Personal
jurisdiction questions are therefore likely to form a fertile basis for
challenging tribal court jurisdiction where member children or their
parents have limited or no contact with the tribe.

Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (noting the “requirement that a tribal
court possess personal jurisdiction over litigants appearing before it”).
175. See Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, Case No. 3:06-cv-00211 TMB, at 10
(D. Alaska filed Feb. 22, 2008), aff’d, 344 Fed. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010) (explaining that in determining a tribal court’s
jurisdiction, “it is the membership of the child that is controlling, not the
membership of the individual parents”); see also John, 982 P.2d at 759 (“A tribe’s
inherent sovereignty to adjudicate internal domestic custody matters depends
on the membership or eligibility for membership of the child.”).
176. S.B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 14 (Alaska 2002)
(citing Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 562–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993))
(concluding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an out-of-state
parent a party to a state court custody case).
177. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006) (defining “Indian Child” as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”).
178. See id.
179. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding that
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires minimum
contacts with the forum state).
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CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court has affirmed the inherent jurisdiction of
tribes in Alaska, concurrent with the State, to initiate ICWA-defined
child custody proceedings, both inside and outside of Indian country.
Resolving thirty years of contentious litigation, the existence and
inherent sovereignty of federally recognized Alaska Native tribes is now
a matter of settled law. With the law clarified by the Tanana decision, the
State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribes can again work cooperatively
in recognition of their shared jurisdiction over proceedings involving
tribal children.

